Mitchell v. Helms: Does Government Aid to Religious Schools Violate the First Amendment? An Extensive Analysis of the Decision and Its Repercussions by Peter Swift
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 41 
Number 2 Volume 41, Fall 2001, Number 2 Article 5 
November 2017 
Mitchell v. Helms: Does Government Aid to Religious Schools 
Violate the First Amendment? An Extensive Analysis of the 
Decision and Its Repercussions 
Peter Swift 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Swift (2001) "Mitchell v. Helms: Does Government Aid to Religious Schools Violate the First 
Amendment? An Extensive Analysis of the Decision and Its Repercussions," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 41 : 
No. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol41/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
MITCHELL v. HELMS: DOES
GOVERNMENT AID TO RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT? AN EXTENSIVE




The United States Constitution prohibits Congress from
enacting legislation regarding the establishment of religion.' The
Establishment Clause grows out of the First Amendment and not
only prohibits the institution of an official church, but also bars
the use of public funds for religious institutions. 2 The religion
* J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law. B.A./B.S.
University of Scranton, summa cum laude (1998).
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ." Id.; see
also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (setting a standard by which
religion clauses were to be interpreted by holding that neither the state or
federal government can set up a religion). But see Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 162-66 (1879). In Reynolds, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, writing
for a unanimous court, declared that religious practices impairing the public
interest did not fall under the protection of the First Amendment. Waite relied
heavily upon history, and in particular Thomas Jefferson, observing that "a wall
of separation between church and State" exists. Id. at 164.
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
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clauses of the First Amendment have been applied to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Courts, however, have recently
held that federal and state aid can be distributed directly and
indirectly to parochial schools. 4  As a result, the federal
government's power to provide aid to religious schools is now
broader than in the past.5 In Mitchell v. Helms,6 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this judicial trend by maintaining that a
statute that authorizes distribution of materials and equipment
394 (1985)) ("It is equally well settled.., that the [sitate may not grant aid to a
religious school, whether cash or in kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that of a
direct subsidy to the religious school' from the [sItate.").
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (stating that the
religion clauses of the First Amendment are applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
4 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (holding that a state
could fund a program that introduced public school teachers onto parochial
school premises for the purpose of providing special education to
underprivileged children); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
13-14 (1993) (permitting a state, as part of a federal program for the disabled, to
provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf student at a Catholic high school);
Witters, 474 U.S. at 482 (holding that the First Amendment does not bar a state
from extending aid "under a state vocational rehabilitation assistance program
to a blind person studying at a Christian college and seeking to become a
pastor, missionary, or youth director"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400
(1983) (holding that a Minnesota statute that allowed state taxpayers to deduct
expenses in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation-including those
incurred for children enrolled in parochial schools--did not violate the First
Amendment); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) ("[Supreme Court]
cases ... have permitted church-related schools to receive government aid in
the form of secular, neutral, or nonideological services, facilities, or materials
that are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that
they attend."); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995) (permitting, based on free speech principles, the
University of Virginia to fund a student publication that promoted a particular
religious belief).
5 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court set
forth a three-part criteria to evaluate whether government aid impermissibly
advanced religion: (1) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;" (2)
"its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;" (3) "the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.' " Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
Governmental aid programs that failed any one of the three prongs were found
to be contrary to the Establishment Clause because they had the impermissible
effect of advancing religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 592 (1989) (noting that the Lemon test required satisfaction of all three
prongs); cf. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-404 (holding that a state tax program did
not violate the Establishment Clause because it satisfied all three prongs
required by the Lemon test).
6 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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to religious institutions in Louisiana " 'cannot reasonably be
viewed as an endorsement of religion.'-7
I. FACTS AND THE COURT'S DECISION
In Mitchell, a group of parents alleged that Chapter 2 of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, as
applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.8 Under this
school aid program, Congress distributes funds providing for "the
acquisition and use of instructional and educational materials,
including library services and materials,... computer software
and hardware for instructional use, and other curricular
materials .... ."9 These federal funds are sent via state
educational agencies to public and private elementary and
secondary schools.1° Services, materials, and equipment provided
7 Id. at 835 (plurality opinion) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235). In
Mitchell, the Court considered the constitutionality of a school aid program
known as Chapter 2. Chief Judge Heebe of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana had held that the assistance had the primary effect of
advancing religion because the materials and equipment disbursed to the
Catholic schools were direct aid to schools that were pervasively sectarian, and
thus violated the second part of the Lemon test. He accordingly granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. See id. at 804. In 1994, having
resolved the other issues in the case, Chief Judge Heebe issued an order
permanently excluding pervasively sectarian schools in Jefferson Parish from
receiving any type of aid under Chapter 2. See id.
Two years later, Chief Judge Heebe retired; Judge Livaudais received the
case and reversed the decision of the former Chief Judge, citing change in this
legal area over the past several years, specifically cases such as Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993) and Walker v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1995). See
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 804-05. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed Judge Livaudais's ruling, holding Chapter 2 as
unconstitutional. In reaching this decision, the Fifth Circuit focused on earlier
Supreme Court decisions such as Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 806-07.
8 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 803-04; see also 20 U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2) (2000).
Section 7351(b)(2) states that the assistance covers programs "Which are tied to
high academic standards and which will be used to improve student
achievement and which are a part of an overall education reform program ... "
Id. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (2000) (defining the scope and
implementation of the Chapter 2 aid program).
9 20 U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2) (2000).
10 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802. Congress allocated the basic responsibility
for the administration of these funds "within the State educational agencies,
but... [the primary] responsibility for the design and implementation of
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to private schools must be "secular, neutral, and
nonideological."" In an average year, about 30% of Chapter 2
funds spent in Jefferson Parish are allocated to private schools,
most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. 12
The plaintiffs argued that these funds are easily divertible to
religious use13 and that the statute has the primary effect of
advancing religion. 14
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, declaring that
Chapter 2 was not a law regarding the establishment of
religion. 15 Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality, used the first
two prongs of the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman 16 to
explain the Court's rationale. 17 Thomas maintained that the
programs ... [is on] that of local educational agencies, school superintendents
and principals, and classroom teachers and supporting personnel...." 20
U.S.C. § 7301(c) (2000); see also 20 U.S.C. § 7312(a) (2000) (requiring that the
allocation of funds by the state educational agency to local educational agencies
be according to the relative enrollments within the school districts of the
agency, but is also adjusted to provide higher allocations to local educational
agencies that have a higher-than-average cost per child because of reasons such
as enrollment by children from low-income families or children living in
sparsely populated areas).
11 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (2000).
12 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 803; see also 20 U.S.C. § 7372(b) (2000) (stating
that the expenditures for private school programs shall be equal, consistent
with the number of children to be served, to expenditures for children enrolled
in the public schools of the same local educational agency).
13 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814-15; see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660 (1980). In Regan, state
reimbursements for testing services were clearly identifiable, and therefore
were separable from religion. See id. The parochial schools did not control the
test's content or its results. See id. at 656. Thus, the majority permitted state
subsidies to private religious schools for particular secular programs such as
testing and taking attendance. The Court, however, indicated that its decision
would likely have been different if there were "no effective means for insuring
that the cash reimbursements would cover only secular services." See id. at 659;
see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780
(1973) (rejecting as unconstitutional a tuition reimbursement program
primarily because it was impossible to certify that the funds would not be used
exclusively for "secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes").
14 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 815 n.7.
15 See id. at 829. In its holding, the Court declared that the two cases relied
on by the Fifth Circuit in holding Chapter 2 unconstitutional, Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 329 (1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), were no longer
good law, calling them "anomalies in our case law." Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808.
16 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807. In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23
(1997), the Court modified the Lemon test "for purposes of evaluating aid to
schools and examined only the first and second factors." Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
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statute has a secular purpose, and does not have the primary
effect of advancing religion. 18 He specifically pointed out that the
aid follows individuals, which means that the decision to support
religious education is essentially made by the individuals
involved, not by the State. 19 Justice Thomas stated that when
the aid to schools is readily available and first travels through
the hands of private citizens who are free to direct the money
elsewhere, then "the government has not provided any 'support of
religion.' "20
The plurality opinion drew an analogy to Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District,21 reasoning that "a government
computer or overhead projector does not itself inculcate a
religious message . . 22Moreover, Thomas maintained that the
807. There, the Court "recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one
criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect." Id. at 808. Thomas further
reasoned that since the resopondents in the instant matter did not dispute the
District Court or Fifth Circuit ruling that the statute has a secular purpose, the
Court would only consider the effect of Chapter 2.
The revised criteria for determining whether a statute has the effect of
advancing religion involves three primary criteria: whether it "result[s] in
governmental indoctrination, define[s] its recipients by reference to religion, or
create[s] an excessive entanglement." Id. (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
But, since the respondents did not challenge the District Court holding that
Chapter 2 does not create an excessive entanglement, the Court would only
consider the first two criteria in determining the statute's effect. See id.
18 See id. at 829-30. The respondents first argued that direct, nonincidental
aid to religious schools always had the effect of being impermissible. Second,
the plaintiffs argued that aid to the religious schools that is divertible to
religious use is similarly impermissible. Justice Thomas dismissed these
arguments as erroneous. See id. at 814-15, 829.
19 See id. at 830-31. Justice Thomas emphasized that the money that
"ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients." Id. at 811 (quoting
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
20 Id. at 816 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 489).
21 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
22 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 823. Justice Thomas stated that the disposition in
Zobrest would be the same if the interpreter for the blind was hired directly by
the government, or if the government supplied the parents with the necessary
funds to hire the interpreter to be used in the religious school. See id. at 819
n.8. Thomas presented a similar hypothetical situation of a government
employer directly sending a portion of an employee's paycheck to the employee's
designated religious institution, as opposed to the employee receiving the
paycheck and then sending it to the institution. See id. Thomas used these
examples to provide support for the Court's holding that the Chapter 2 funds
passed constitutional muster. According to Thomas, just as a government
interpreter does not impart a religious message, the same is true for
instructional materials such as maps and film projectors. See id. at 823.
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schools serve as the bailees of the Chapter 2 aid, while the real
beneficiaries are the students attending these religious schools.23
The plurality came to the ultimate conclusion that the Chapter 2
funds cannot reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion
and accordingly held that Jefferson Parish need not exclude
religious schools from its Chapter 2 program. 24
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
plurality that the aid program was constitutional as applied in
Jefferson Parish.25 O'Connor articulated two reasons that
compelled her to write separately.26 First, she concluded that the
plurality applied an inordinate amount of attention to neutrality,
coming close to giving the concept "singular importance in the
future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to
government school-aid programs."27 Second, she maintained that
the plurality's approval of government aid being diverted to
religious indoctrination conflicted with the Supreme Court's
precedents, and also was unnecessary to decide this case.28
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter concluded that
23 See id. at 831.
24 See id. at 829.
25 See id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with
the plurality that Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 329 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977), were inconsistent with the Court's judgment in the present
case, and thus should be overruled. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837. She also
agreed with the plurality that Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), was the
controlling precedential authority and explained three similarities between
Agostini and this case. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837. First, like the Title I
program in Agostini, Chapter 2 aid is distributed on the basis of a neutral,
secular criteria, and is made available regardless of whether students attend
public or private schools. Second, the Chapter 2 funds were made only to
supplement the funds otherwise available to a religious school. Third, similar to
the Title I program considered in Agostini, all Chapter 2 funds are controlled by
public agencies and never actually make their way inside these religious
schools. See id. at 848. Accordingly, she concurred in the judgment and joined in
reversing the Fifth Circuit's decision. See id. at 837.
26 See Mitchell at 837-38.
27 Id. at 837. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized the importance
of neutrality in analyzing Establishment Clause controversies, but she stated
that it is not the only "axiom in the history and precedent of the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 839 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995)).
28 See id. at 837-38. Justice O'Connor strongly emphasized that the
Establishment Clause does not permit the actual diversion of secular
government aid to religious indoctrination. According to O'Connor, the Supreme
Court's decisions "provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance
religious activities." Id. at 840 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847).
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religious teaching cannot be separated from secular education in
religious schools, and thus, direct government subsidies to
religious schools should be prohibited because they will
"inevitably and impermissibly support religious indoctrination."29
He outlined three primary reasons to declare Chapter 2 aid
unconstitutional.30 First, compelling an individual to support
religion is contrary to the principle of freedom of conscience. 31
Second, he stated that this type of aid inevitably corrupts
religion.32 Third, he averred that government establishment of
religion is perpetually associated with conflict. 33
Following these premises, Justice Souter indicated that
there were no safeguards in the Jefferson Parish program that
obstructed the transfer of Chapter 2 property to religious
purposes in the future.34 State and local officials admitted that
nothing prevents the Chapter 2 equipment from use in religious
instruction,35 and no device is employed to cease the likelihood
29 Id. at 887 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1995) (stating that a state cannot grant aid to a
religious school where the effect is a direct subsidy to the school); cf NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1979) (distinguishing between the
church-teacher relationship in a religious school from the employer-employee
relationship in a public school).
30 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870-72.
31 See id. at 870. In his dissent, Justice Souter cited Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, who were instrumental in the enactment of the First
Amendment, and their emphasis on the protection of governmental intrusion on
religious liberty. He quoted Madison, who stated: "[Tihe same authority which
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment." Id. at 870-71 (internal citations omitted).
32 See id. at 871; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (stating
that the "first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause]
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion").
33 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 872; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 578-79 (1989) (detailing the controversy surrounding placement of a
creche depicting the Christian Nativity scene and menorah near government
buildings).
34 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 902-03. Justice Souter maintained that little is
known about the use of the aid due to the anemic enforcement system available.
"The type of aid, the structure of the program, and the lack of effective
safeguards clearly demonstrate the divertibility of the aid." Id. at 903.
According to Souter, tape recorders, projection screens, maps, computers, and
other instructional materials can easily be used for religious purposes by the
religious teachers. See id.
35 See id. at 907. Justice Souter pointed to evidence that the teachers in
Jefferson Parish admitted that the Chapter 2 computers were joined with non-
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that the equipment would be used for a religious purpose.36
Souter concluded with statistics showing that these religious
schools have a common objective-to engage in religious
indoctrination-which gives rise to serious Establishment Clause
concerns .37
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court ruled that the distribution of
the Chapter 2 funds in Jefferson Parish did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.38 According to
the Court, the allocation of funds was permissible because "it
neither results in religious indoctrination by the government nor
defines its recipients by reference to religion."39 While parochial
schools received direct, nonincidental aid from the government,
the Court strongly emphasized that the aid was secular.40 This
Chapter 2 computers in religious schools and the Chapter 2 computers were
used whenever there was a breakdown of the computing system. See id. at 910.
One religious school actually admitted that the Chapter 2 aid was used to
create a library. See id. at 910-11 n.28. This evidence shows that the Chapter 2
aid was not only supplementing their own budget in many areas, but that the
school administrators used the aid to supplant their own funds. See id.
36 See id. at 906-07. There was no effective system to monitor religious
schools; local educational agencies at times had no idea "(a) what was
purchased or (b) how it was utilized." Id. at 906. Monitors visited sporadically
and made only weak attempts at record keeping. Furthermore, many of the
religious teachers were not informed of the restrictions involved. See id. There
was not even "so much as an assurance that they would use Chapter 2
computers solely for secular purposes." Id. at 907.
37 See id. at 904-06 nn.21-25. Justice Souter cited the trial judge's detailed
record in his dissent. The record included evidence that most of the schools were
Roman Catholic, the majority of them were pervasively sectarian, and their
common mission and objective was to engage in religious education. Their
teachers taught religiously. According to Souter, this creates the gravest
concerns under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 904-06.
Furthermore, the trial judge found that the Roman Catholic schools in
question operated directly under the Archbishop of New Orleans. See id. at 904
n.23. The mission of many of these schools was consistent with the published
statements of the Archdiocese. See id. at 905 n.24. "The schools include
religious symbols in their classrooms, require attendance at daily religion
classes, conduct sacramental preparation classes during the schoolday, require
attendance at mass, and provide extracurricular religious activities. At least
some [schools] exercise a religious preference in accepting students and in
charging tuition." Id. at 904-05 n.23 (internal citations omitted).
38 Id. at 829, 835 (plurality opinion).
39 Id. at 808; see also supra note 17.
40 Id. at 831-32. Additionally, while the plurality agreed with the dissent
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Comment asserts that the statute granting aid to the parochial
schools in Jefferson Parish violates the Establishment Clause
and therefore should be declared invalid. In addition, it contends
that the effect of this type of government aid program is the
obstruction of the recipient religious institutions' ability to carry
out their primary religious mission. This Comment will also
consider the requirement of secular state authorities to monitor
the religious schools' allocation of funds and implementation of
their religious mission.
Following these themes, this Comment will first discuss how
the aid to the religious schools in Jefferson Parish is easily
divertible to religious use, making it a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 41 Divertibility is readily shown by the
ineffectiveness of the government's monitoring program and by
the failure of the religious schools to provide evidence regarding
the utilization of the materials acquired.42 Second, the
government aid fails the second prong of the Lemon test because
the statute has the effect of advancing religion.43 This is
demonstrated through the "pervasively sectarian" nature of the
religious schools involved, as well as the common objective and
mission of these schools to engage in religious education.44
Finally, this Comment will discuss how such government aid
programs create an excessive entanglement between church and
state, in violation of the third Lemon prong.45
A. Divertibility of Government Aid
As a basic principle of the Establishment Clause, a statute
that there was evidence of actual diversion, it held that this evidence was not
relevant to the constitutional inquiry. See id. at 833-34 ("The issue is not
divertibility of aid but rather whether the aid itself has an impermissible
content. Where the aid would be suitable for use in a public school, it is also
suitable for use in any private school.") On the other hand, Justice O'Connor
argued that evidence of actual divertibility was de minimis. See id. at 864-65
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 See id. at 868-69 (Souter, J., dissenting).
42 See id. at 906-07.
43 See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1986) (stating that a direct subsidy to a religious school is impermissible under
the second Lemon prong).
44 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 904.
45 In the context of evaluating aid to schools, the Court recast the third
Lemon prong as one criterion relevant to determining the second Lemon prong
(the statute's effect). See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08; see also supra note 17.
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may not provide public aid for religion or provide assistance for
the religious objective of any institution.46 Any instructional
materials distributed to church-related schools must be secular,
nonideological, and neutral47 The aid must not be available for
religious use and the religious instructors involved cannot
attempt to reinforce and reflect the ideological view of the
sectarian school upon the children.48 In addition, direct aid to
"pervasively sectarian" schools constitutes aid to the schools'
efforts to proselytize religious values among its students.49 Thus,
financial aid to religious schools generates a primary effect that
advances religion, in violation of the second prong of the Lemon
test.
In the Louisiana program at issue in Mitchell, the majority
of the private schools receiving aid are pervasively sectarian and
the teachers instruct with an objective to engage in religious
education.50 Many of the religious schools display religious
symbols in classrooms,51 require attendance at daily religious
class,52 require attendance at mass, 53 and offer extracurricular
religious activities.54 Also, many of the Roman Catholic schools
act under the authority of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 55
which requires religious preferences for hiring teachers in
46 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Establishment Clause "bars the use of public funds for religious aid").
47 See id. at 880.
48 See id. at 890.
49 See id. at 887 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
13-14 (1993)).
50 See id. at 904-05; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)
(disallowing the supplementation of the salary of teachers of secular subjects in
nonpublic elementary schools). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315
(1952) (holding that the release of public school students during school hours so
that they may attend religious instruction off school grounds passed
constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause).
51 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 904 n.23.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 905 n.23.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 904 n.23. The mission and objectives outlined by the Roman
Catholic schools in Jefferson Parish also support the conclusion that these
institutions' primary objective is religious instruction. See id. at 905 n.24.
Furthermore, according to the president of a sectarian high school, teachers are
instructed that their answers be consistent with the teachings of the Catholic
Church and "that they respond in that way to the students, so that there can be
opportunities in other classes other than religion where discussion of religion
could take place ..."Id. at 906 n.25.
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parochial schools.56
As a result, the risk of immediate and future diversion of
government aid to religious use becomes abundantly clear.
Though the instructional materials and equipment provided by
the Chapter 2 funds are specifically designated not for religious
use but for secular purposes, 57 in actuality, the contrary may be
true.58 A teacher or a guidance counselor in a religious school
might engage in unrestricted conversation with the student and
at times fail to separate religious teaching from his secular
responsibilities.59 This kind of communication provides an
unacceptable occasion for the intrusion of religious influence.60
In order to properly monitor that the aid is used for secular
purposes, and thus ensure that there are no constitutional
violations, comprehensive and continuous surveillance is
needed. 61 This type of surveillance system is not present in the
Jefferson Parish program.6 2
Now, after the plurality's decision in Mitchell, if Congress
wants to provide direct aid to religious schools, it could clearly do
so. 63 A legislature merely needs to state a secular objective to
legalize massive aid to any religious sect that they choose.64 Such
56 See id. at 905 n.25.
57 See id. at 831 (plurality opinion).
58 See id. at 907-08 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Souter maintained that although the applicable statute, 20 U.S.C. §
7372(c)(1), stipulates that materials are only being "lent" to nonpublic schools,
there is actually "nothing in the Jefferson Parish program [that] stood in the
way of giving the Chapter 2 property outright to the religious schools when it
became older." Id.; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (stating
that aid "may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission .... ").
59 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971) (recognizing that a
religious person teaching at a school designed to impart religious doctrine
would inevitably have difficulty remaining religiously neutral).
60 See id. at 622-23 (finding that to allow public funds for religious teaching
would promote political division along religious lines, "one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect").
61 See id. at 619 (stating that "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these
restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. ").
62 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 906 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
pointed out that the plurality noted the apparent ineffectiveness of the
government's monitoring program. There was no system in operation to
determine what was purchased or how it was actually utilized. See id.
63 See id. at 901 n.19.
64 See id. Such an action is contrary to the principles of the Establishment
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an effect violates the principle that, whatever the subject taught,
"the [sitate must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion... "65 If religion is
advanced in their teaching, extreme division along religious lines
would result, which is one of the main depravities that the
Establishment Clause was intended to protect against.66
B. Primary Effect of Advancing Religion
As a matter of precedent, courts have held that any use of
government funds to promote or advance religious doctrines
violates the Establishment Clause.67 In the past, this type of aid
has been held as constitutionally impermissible because it has
the primary effect of providing a direct and substantial
advancement of sectarian education, a violation of the second
Lemon prong.68 It remains virtually impossible to separate
secular education functions from sectarian. Thus, Chapter 2
government aid, in effect, supports the religious objective of
Clause. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (stating that "[n]o
tax... can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions ... ."); F.
King Alexander & Klinton W. Alexander, The Reassertion of Church Doctrine in
American Higher Education: The Legal and Fiscal Implications of the Ex Corde
Ecclesiae for Catholic Colleges and Universities in the United States, 29 J.L. &
EDUC. 149, 166-67 (2000) (emphasizing that indirect and direct aid to private
religious universities violates the Establishment Clause).
65 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (1971); see also Danielle Jess Latham, Wall of
Separation or Path to Interaction: The Uncertain Constitutional Future of
School Vouchers in Light of Inconsistent Developments in Judicial Neutrality
Between Church and State, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 420 (2000) (discussing how
aid to religious schools in the form of vouchers is unconstitutional as violative of
the Establishment Clause).
66 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
794 (1973) (discussing the potential for divisiveness raised by state assistance
to religious programs).
67 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (1947). In Everson, Justice Black cited James
Madison in Memorial and Remonstrance to support his decision. Madison
argued that:
[a] true religion did not need the support of law; that no person,
either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a
religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society
required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that
cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-
established religions.
Id. at 12.
68 See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1986) (stating that it is "well settled" that a state may not directly subsidize a
religious school).
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religious schools in Jefferson Parish.69 Furthermore, aid to
religious schools that supplants their original expenditures
creates nothing more than payment for replacing materials that
had originally been purchased by the schools. 70
Church-related schools in Jefferson Parish have a religious
mission and objective, and they intend to retain it.71 The
education supplied in these religious schools is rooted in the
instructors' individual and personal obligations, who then pass
their religious values and beliefs on to the students in
attendance.72 This process of indoctrinating religion is also
"enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in primary
schools particularly."73 Therefore, because religious teaching
cannot be separated from secular education in religious schools,
government aid to sectarian schools only has the effect of
inevitably and impermissibly advancing religion.
Although the Court fervently believes that the materials
distributed would be used for purely secular objectives, there
remains a substantial risk that teachers will take the
opportunity, "unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in
the religious precepts of the sponsoring church."74 This result of
indoctrination develops despite an assumption of good faith on
the part of the teachers to perform within the restrictions
imposed by the First Amendment. s
69 In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring),
Justice O'Connor described the harm of government endorsement of religion.
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."
Id.
70 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 896 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
see also, e.g., Cochran v. La. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930)
(upholding a state severance tax devoted to supplying school children with
school books). The Court reasoned that the program was constitutional because
sectarian schools are not relieved of any obligations.
71 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 904-06.
72 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-18 (1971) (declaring that the
religious nature of church-related schools inevitably poses a danger of
impermissible church-state relationships).
73 Id. at 616; see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 749 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (stating that the impressionable age of elementary and
secondary school students is a relevant inquiry).
74 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 894 (quoting Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973)).
75 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618 (noting that a "dedicated religious person,
teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its
41 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
In Everson v. Board of Education,6 the Supreme Court held
that no tax could be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions. 77 Nevertheless, the Court held that the statute in
issue was constitutional because reimbursing parents of
parochial school students for bus transportation does not
handicap or favor religion.78 The Court feared that if the statute
was declared invalid, parents would be reluctant to enroll their
children in religious schools, making it more difficult for the
schools to operate.79  This would contradict the important
neutrality objective behind the addition of the Establishment
Clause to the Constitution.80
Unlike the bus program in Everson, there has been no
attempt on the part of government officials in Mitchell to
guarantee that the government aid would not be used in support
of the religious functions.81 The assistance provided in Mitchell
consists of materials such as film projectors, tape recorders,
maps, and computers.8 2  These instructional aids, as
distinguished from the financial grants to parents in Everson,
could easily be used by religious instructors for religious
purposes.8 3 Without the grants, religious schools would have to
pay for the educational services with privately raised funds.84
tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously
neutral").
76 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
77 See id. at 15-16.
78 See id. at 17.
79 See id. at 17-18.
80 See R. Craig Wood & Michael C. Petko, Assessing Agostini v. Felton in
Light of Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Coming of Age in the Debate Between
Religious Affiliated Schools and State Aid, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 2-4 (2000)
(reviewing the Supreme Court's evaluation of the neutrality involved in such
state-sponsored activities as supplementing private school teachers' salaries
and reimbursing private school funds for textbooks when these expenses are
incurred for secular purposes).
81 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 906-07 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the ineffectiveness of the government's monitoring program). In
Everson, the government provided neither financial nor any other form of
support to the parochial schools themselves. The program merely helped
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, to school safely. See
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
82 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 903.
83 See id.
84 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671-72 (1970) (stating that
"making textbooks available to pupils in parochial schools.., was surely anlaid' to the sponsoring churches because it relieved these churches of an
enormous aggregate cost for those books").
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With the grants, more private funds are available for religious
education.85 Thus, because these grants free funds that
otherwise would be used to pay for state-mandated services, their
primary effect is to advance religion.86 Hence, the Chapter 2
funds in Louisiana are in violation of the second prong of the
Lemon test, and should be declared unconstitutional.
III. EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ENTANGLEMENT
While aid from the government should not be given to
private schools, the trend in the United States seems to be going
in that direction.87 Under the leadership of President George W.
Bush, the opportunities for government aid to "faith-based"
organizations are multiplying.88 The conservative Supreme
Court that decided Mitchell has proven itself sympathetic to the
idea of government assistance to parochial schools.89 Although
this trend appears unstoppable, it results in nothing more than
an unacceptable entanglement of the state in the affairs of the
church, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
As shown in Mitchell, many religious schools are eager to
receive government funds. A looming danger to consider in this
debate is the interference of the government in the mission of
these schools. With increasing and easier access to public money
has come greater public scrutiny.90 Concern is rising among
85 See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (acknowledging, but not
accepting, the theory that that aid to private schools for secular expenses frees
those schools to use their resources for a religious purpose).
86 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that a
statute's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion").
87 See, e.g., Phil Roach, Reader Responses, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb.
20, 2001, at 10A (urging the Department of Education to underwrite full tuition
vouchers for all children in a school district); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) ("[C]ustodial oversight of the student-initiated
religious group.., does not impermissibly entangle government [with
religion]....").
88 See, e.g., Marc Lacey with Laurie Goodstein, Bush Fleshes Out Details of
Proposal to Expand Aid to Religious Organizations, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2001,
at A15 (reporting President Bush's announcement of new federal grants to
support certain religious organizations).
89 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion).
90 See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1998) (noting the
significant level of supervisory and reporting tasks required of a state agent to
monitor progress of students attending private schools by virtue of public
funding).
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parochial educators that the potential for vast government
regulation may be imminent if public money is accepted.91
In Jackson v. Benson,92 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
ruled that a state-funded voucher program does not violate the
separation of church and state.93 The program at issue allows
poor children in Milwaukee to attend the public or private school
of their choice, including religious schools. 94 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision was based on the view that the
qualifying parents should determine which schools receive their
voucher dollars.95 In this way, the court was satisfied that the
government would not be able to turn private schools into public
schools in violation of the Establishment Clause.96 Subsequently,
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of the case, 97
spawning voucher efforts in several states.
Despite the support of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the
Wisconsin voucher effort could presage widespread government
meddling in private education.98 In order to participate in the
voucher program, religious schools had to concede to a number of
federal and state regulations.99 Most strikingly, participating
schools may not show religious preference in their voucher
admissions, and voucher students cannot be required to
participate in any religious activity, including religious education
classes.100 This raises questions for schools with religious
missions. Nearly all of Milwaukee's Catholic schools are
91 See Ray Quintanilla & Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Bush Offers School Plan;
Archdiocese Likes It But City Doesn't, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 2001, at 1 ("[Plrivate
schools ... worry that vouchers may come with rigid government
regulations.").
92 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
93 See id. at 607.
94 See id. at 607-08.
95 See id. at 626.
96 See id.
97 See Jackson v. Benson, 525 U.S. 997, 997 (1998).
98 See Joe Loconte, Schools Learn That Vouchers Can Have a Hidden Cost,
WALL. ST. J., Jan. 26, 1999, at A18 ("[Tihe victory in Wisconsin [upholding the
constitutionality of the voucher program] also serves as a reminder that, given
the chance, choice opponents will turn voucher programs into a Trojan horse for
government meddling in private and religious schools."); see also Joe Loconte,
Paying the Piper: Will Vouchers Undermine the Mission of Religious Schools?,
93 POLy REV. 30-36 (1999) (evaluating the potential adverse impact of vouchers
on the mission of religious schools).
99 See Loconte, Schools Learn That Vouchers Can Have a Hidden Cost,
supra note 98, at A18.
100 See id.
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participating in the voucher program, yet many Protestant
denominations and Jewish schools have refused to be included in
this plan. 01
Although no Milwaukee or Louisiana Catholic student has
"opted out" of religious education,1 2 odds are that in the near
future, students will feel pressured to conform to a religion other
than their own. When that occurs, civil liberties groups will
likely be ready with a lawsuit to attempt regulation of the
religious schools. In schools where religion is closely entwined
with all aspects of the curriculum, as in many evangelical
Protestant Schools, it may become impossible for the religious
and secular elements of the schools to be separated.103
Already, more conservative religious groups have decided not
to participate in voucher programs in Wisconsin because they are
afraid of the slippery slope of government intrusion. 0 4 Civil
liberties groups have asserted that if taxpayer dollars are spent
on religious schools, then government oversight must be
applied.105 The courts have rejected the latter view so far, but if
hypothetical public statements and real life lawsuits continue, it
may prove to be disastrous for the religious schools. Parochial
schools would be wise to exercise caution over the amount of
their involvement with the government. The U.S. Constitution
was designed to keep church and state separate. If the
entanglement continues in this new decade, it could possibly
destroy the special moral and educational tenor of religious
schools.
CONCLUSION
The Chapter 2 government aid program in Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana is directly contrary to the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. The type of aid, the structure of the
101 See Loconte, Paying the Piper: Will Vouchers Undermine the Mission of
Religious Schools?, supra note 98, at 30-36.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id; see also Marc D. Stern, School Vouchers-The Church-State
Debate That Really Isn't, 31 CONN. L. REV. 977, 983 (1999) (stating that much of
the support for vouchers comes from 'libertarian think tanks," not from
religious groups).
105 See Loconte, Schools Learn That Vouchers Can Have a Hidden Cost,
supra note 98, at A18.
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program, and the lack of effective safeguards clearly demonstrate
the divertibility of the aid. Moreover, little is known about use of
the aid due to the lax enforcement currently in place. This
reveals that actual diversion actually has occurred. The
Jefferson Parish aid program also has the primary effect of
advancing religion due to the "pervasively sectarian" nature of
the religious schools involved, and thus violates the second prong
of the Lemon test. Finally, this type of aid package has the
potential damaging effect of government entanglement between
church and state that may harm the parochial schools that take
part in the program. The Establishment Clause was created to
prohibit Congress and the states from making any law respecting
an establishment of religion. With the decision holding the
Chapter 2 statute constitutional, the Mitchell Court
misinterpreted the First Amendment and undermined the
constitutional rights of American citizens.
